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I. INTRODUCTION: IDENTITY THEFT IN THE UNITED STATES

As anyone who has ever been a victim knows, identity theft is a huge
problem. The U.S. Department of Justice defines identity theft as "all
types of crime in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another
person's personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception,
typically for economic gain."' If a cybercriminal were to obtain an
individual's personal information, the cybercriminal could use that
information to steal that individual's money, ruin that individual's
finances by racking up thousands of dollars in credit card debt, destroy
the individual's reputation, commit other crimes using the individual's
identity, and even physically threaten that individual's safety and wellbeing. Even worse, the costs of repairing the damage caused by an
identity theft could be catastrophic in itself, assuming the damage is not
irreparable. 3
With society's growing reliance upon the internet and vast amounts of
information Americans share in one way or another online, the internet
has made identity theft even easier for criminals.4 Recently, Americans
have seen an increase in online identity theft as a result of cyber criminals
hacking into corporations' consumer databases. In 2013, hackers stole the
credit card information of over 110 million Target customers.5 Shortly
after the Target hack, customers' credit card information became
available on the black market for $20-$100 per card.6 In 2014,
entertainment giant Sony fell victim to one of the biggest hacks ever on
an American company.' Although much of the media's attention focused
on the cyber thieves' threatened terrorist attack as a response to Sony's
upcoming release of "The Interview," the cyber thieves also stole massive
amounts of data from the company, including personal emails, medical
information, and even social security numbers of its employees.8 In early
1.

Identity Theft, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE http://www.justice.gov/criminal/-

/fraud/websitesidentity-theft/identity-theft-and-identity-fraudwebsites (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
2. Id; ID Theft, Fraud, & Victims of Cyber Crime, NAT'LSTAYSAFEONLINE - NAT'L
CYBER SEC. ALLIANCE, https://www.staysafeonline.org/stay-safe-online/protect-your-personal-

information/id-theft-and-fraud (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
3. See Identity Theft, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Elizabeth A. Harris et al., A Sneaky Path into Target Customers' Wallets, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/business/a-sneaky-path-into-target-custom
ers-wallets.html.
6. Deborah Hastings, More BadNews for TargetShoppers: HackedCreditCardNumbers
Now on Black Market, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/black-market-flooded-40-million-credit-card-numbers-stolen-target-article-1.1554858.
7. Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Cyberattack, Firsta Nuisance, Swiftly Grew
into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/business/
media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisance-swiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html?_r-0.
8. Id.

STATE SANCTIONED IDENTITY THEFT: WHYPERSONAL INFORMATION

2015]1

419

2015, hackers stole from health insurance company Anthem the names,
dates of birth, social security numbers, member ID numbers, addresses,
phone numbers, email addresses, and employment information of 80
million of its customers.9 Many experts and privacy advocates believe
that, based on the information that was stolen, the Anthem hacking could
lead to more identity theft than the Target hacks.' 0
These security breaches are alarming because they show that even
large corporations, with all of their resources, are susceptible to cyber
threats. The information that was stolen in these hacks is enough to allow
identity thieves to create new credit card accounts in the victim's names,
access the victims' existin financial accounts, and commit nearly any
other type of identity theft. ' What's worse is that these hacks show that
there is a growing black market for individuals' personal information.
Cyber security experts agree that 2015 will see a continued rise in cyber
identity theft.1 2 And while these large-scale attacks are certainly a
continuing threat to individuals' identities, hacking corporate databases
is not the only way that thieves commit identity theft. Access to public
records can also help facilitate identity crimes, and identity thieves can
get the personal information they need to commit their crimes straight
from state government websites.' 3 Even though some local governments
have begun to take these websites down, the damage has likely already
been done, since archive websites preserve information from websites
even after the site has been removed.1 4 Therefore, public record policies
that were enacted with the good intentions of government transparency
may also have the unintended consequence of making identity theft
easier.
This Article seeks to explore the threat of identity theft through public
disclosure of the information contained within a Homeless Management
Information System (HMIS), an electronic database containing personal

9.

Chad Terhune, Anthem Hack Exposes Data on 80 Million; Experts Warn of Identity

Theft, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anthem-hacked-2015020
4-story.html# page=l.
10. Id. Paul Stephens, director of policy and advocacy at the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
stated that "[tihe information can be used not only to establish new credit accounts but also
potentially penetrate existing accounts at financial institutions or a stock brokerage. The scope of
the information involved is incredible." Id.
11. Id.
12.

Adam Bennett, Websense Security Labs Reveals CybersecurityPredictions, WEBSENSE

(Nov. 18, 2014), http://community.websense.com/blogs/websense-news-releases/archive/2014/
11/1 8/websense-2015-security-predictions.aspx.
13. Lisa Myers, Online Public Records FacilitateID Theft, NBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2007),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/16813496/ns/nbcnightlynews withbrian williams-nbcnewsi
nvestigates/t/online-public-records-facilitate-id-theft/#.VPsmUL4vlJ.
14.

8, 2015).

Reviving Dead Links, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/about/ (last visited Mar.
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information of all homeless persons served by shelters that receive federal
funding through the McKinney-Vento Act.15 This Article will provide a
brief background on an HMIS and Florida's open government laws. All
recipients of McKinney-Vento funding must participate in the database,
and federal regulations allow state officials to view the database in order
to provide services to their state's homeless.' 6 While an HMIS is not by
itself a public record, the federal regulations governing an HMIS were
drafted in a way that may, through Florida's broad o en government
laws, technically qualify an HMIS as a public record.' If considered a
public record for purposes of disclosure under Florida law, most of the
information contained within an HMIS would not qualify under any of
the statutory exemptions from Florida's open government laws.' 8
This Article will also make the best case for why the current federal
regulations governing disclosure of personal information within an HMIS
should preempt Florida law. However, as the law currently stands, it is
unclear whether the federal regulations governing privacy and disclosure
of the personal information within an HMIS are strong enough to preempt
Florida law. This Article will also provide alternative solutions to the
potential issue of disclosure under Florida law. The federal government
should amend the federal regulations governing privacy and disclosure of
the personal information within HMIS to provide clearer and stronger
language regarding limitations on disclosure. Even if the federal
regulations as they currently stand or, after being amended to include
stronger protections, do preempt Florida law, the better solution would
involve Florida law expressly exempting the information contained in an
HMIS. Lastly, in light of the increasing instances of identity theft, the
federal government should reconsider what information is truly necessary
to collect as a part of an HMIS.
II. THE HOMELESS MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

At the turn of the new millennium, a number of congressional
committees and reports showed a general concern with the lack of
effective and reliable information concerning homelessness in America.19
Congress had enacted a number of programs in the late 1980s to fund
15. See generally Homeless Management Information System (HMIS); Data and Technical
Standards Final Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 45888 (July 30, 2004).
16. Id. at 45898-99.
17. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24; FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (2014). See generally Homeless
Management Information System (HMIS), Data and Technical Standards Final Notice, 69 Fed.
Reg. 45888-99 [hereinafter HMIS].
18. See FLA. STAT. § 119.071 (2014).
19. See HMIS, supra note 17, at 45898.

42 1
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homeless assistance shelters throughout the country, yet nearly a decade
and a half later, it had never reviewed nor analyzed the extent of
homelessness and the federal programs' effects at addressing it.2" In order
to better assess their programs, Congress directed the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to collect an unduplicated count
of homeless individuals served, the basic characteristics (such as age,
race, and disability status) of those served, the services they received, and
the results of receiving those services. 2 1
Partly in response to the data HUD collected, Congress reauthorized
the McKinney-Vento Act in 2004. Congress, recognizing the severity of
homelessness, found that homelessness was at an unprecedented level,
local and state organizations could not meet "the basic human needs of
all the homeless," and that the situation would only get worse if the
Federal Government did not act. 22 "[T]he Federal Government," the act
proclaimed, "has a clear responsibility and an existing capacity to fulfill
a more effective and responsible role to meet the basic human needs and
to engender respect for the human dignity of the homeless." 23
In order to ensure that the federal government was effectively meeting
these needs, Congress authorized HUD to oversee the implementation of
McKinney-Vento funding. Again, Congress directed HUD to
[access] the service needs of homeless persons; [ensure] that
services are directed to meeting those needs; [assess] the outcomes
of the services in nurturing efforts by homeless persons to become
more self-sufficient; and [report] to Congress on the characteristics
and effectiveness of Federal efforts to address homelessness. 24
In order to make these assessments, Congress required HUD to collect
the personal information of any recipient of federal aid authorized under
the McKinney-Vento Act.25 To best effectuate Congress's intent, HUD
created the Homeless Management Information System to utilize
computer technology in assisting with this data collection.26
"A Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) is a local
information technology system used to collect client-level data and data
on the provision of housing and services to homeless individuals and
families and persons at risk of homelessness." 2 7 All organizations
20. See S. Rep. No. 106-410, at 50 (2000).
21. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-610, at 32-33 (1998).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (2004).
23. Id
24. HMIS, supranote 17, at 45898-99.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 45897.
27.

Homeless Management Information System,

HUD

https://www.hudexchange.info/hmis/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).

EXCHANGE

DEVELOPMENT,
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receiving federal funding through the McKinney-Vento Act must utilize
an HMIS in order to collect an unduplicated count of individuals
experiencing homelessness and better analyze the needs of each
geographic area.2 8 An HMIS software application is designed to assist a
"Continuum of Care" (CoC) in accurately counting and reporting on the
service needs of homeless persons throughout the CoC's jurisdiction. 29 A
CoC is an organization tasked with overseeing the implementation of an
HMIS at the local level in accordance with the federal regulations set in
place by HUD. 30 Each CoC is comprised of representatives from various
service providers (many of them homeless shelters) in the CoC's
particular area or jurisdiction. 3 1 The individual service providers report
the information they collect to their local CoC, and the CoC then
aggregates the data and removes any duplicate information before
sending it to HUD. 3 2 Although different service providers may collect
different client information depending on the source of their federal
funding, all HMIS participants at a minimum must collect the same
fourteen universal data elements. 33
Just as HUD oversees the implementation of an HMIS at the national
level, the various CoCs are required to ensure service provider

28. Homeless Management Information System Requirements, 76 Fed. Reg. 76917-01,
76918, 76922 (proposed Dec. 9, 2011) [hereinafter HMIS Requirements].
The purpose of HMIS is to record and store client-level information about the
numbers, characteristics and needs of persons who use homeless housing and
supportive services and about persons who receive assistance for persons at
risk of homelessness over time, to produce an unduplicated count of homeless
persons for each Continuum of Care; to understand the extent and nature of
homelessness locally, regionally and nationally; and to understand patterns of
service use and measure the effectiveness of programs.
Id. at 76918.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 11360(a)(f)(3)(A)-(C) (2009).
30. See U.S DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HMIS DATA STANDARDS DATA DICTIONARY,
6 (May 2014), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/HMIS-Data-Dictionary.pdf
[hereinafter DATA DICTIONARY].

3 1. Id. Organizations represented include nonprofit homeless providers, victim service
providers, faith-based organizations, governments, businesses, advocates, public housing
agencies, school districts, social service providers, mental health agencies, hospitals, universities,
affordable housing developers, and law enforcement, and organizations that serve homeless and
formerly homeless persons. Id. O
32. HMIS,supranote 17, at45901.
33. Id. at 45905. Universal data elements include: Name, Social Security Number, Date of
Birth, Ethnicity and Race, Gender, Veteran Status, Disabling Condition, Residence Prior to
Program Entry, Zip Code of Last Permanent Address, Program Entry Date, Program Exit Date,
Unique Person Identification Number, Program Identification Number, and Household
Identification. Id.
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participation in an HMIS at the local level.34 Each CoC must abide by the
rules set in place by HUD, or risk sanctions that could result in a service
provider no longer receiving federal aid.3 Congress authorized the
Secretary of HUD to develop data collection standards for HMIS in order
to provide for encryption of sensitive information, limited disclosure, and
any other standards that the Secretary deems necessary.3 6 Like all
administrative agencies, HUD published its privacy and security
standards in a series of Final Notices in the Federal Registrar, beginning
in 2004. In short, Congress tells HUD to collect the data, HUD creates
the rules for data collection by the CoCs, the CoCs ensure that individual
service providers follow these rules, and the individual service providers
collect the personal information from their clients.

III. IMIS PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROTECTIONS

Generally speaking, all CoCs are required to keep all personally
identifying information secure and confidential. Personally identifying
information is defined as:
[I]ndividually identifying information for or about an individual,
including information likely to disclose the location of a victim of
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking,
including-(A) a first and last name; (B) a home or other physical
address; (C) contact information (including a postal, e-mail or
Internet protocol address, or telephone or facsimile number); (D)
a social security number; and (E) any other information, including
date of birth, racial or ethnic background, or religious affiliation,
that, in combination with any other non-personally identifying
information, would serve to identify any individual.3 8
HUD laid out its technical privacy and security policies in more detail
in its 2004 Final Notice. 3 9 Recognizing the importance of privacy and the
need for standard procedures across all HMIS participants, the Secretary
of HUD mandated minimum confidentiality requirements regarding
personally identifying information (sometimes referred to as personally
protected information, or PII) that all organizations participating in HMIS

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 45888.
42 U.S.C. § 1360a(f)(3)(D) (2009).
24 C.F.R. §§ 576.500(x), 578.103(b) (2014).
42 U.S.C. § 11360(16) (2012).
See generallyHMIS, supra note 17, at 45888.
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must meet. 40 "The standards seek to protect the confidentiality of
personal information while allowing for reasonable, responsible, and
limited uses and disclosures of data." 4 1
The 2004 Final Notice was written specifically in response to public
concern over whether HUD was adequately protecting clients' personal
information. 42 The standards articulate a desire to protect confidentiality
of personal information, but lack explicit directions as to how to protect
confidentiality. 43 States or individual CoCs may enact stricter privacy
protections than the baseline requirements, but the guidelines mandate
that a provider must not dip below the standards laid out by the
Secretary. 44 Outside of a criminal investigation, HMIS data may only be
released "(1) [t]o provide or coordinate services to an individual; (2) for
functions related to payment or reimbursement for services; (3) to carry
out administrative functions, including but not limited to legal, audit,
personnel, oversight and management functions; or (4) for creating deidentified PPI." 4 5
While the standards set out in the 2004 Final Notice would seem rather
straightforward, HUD might not have contemplated state laws that would
allow for lesser protections than the standards it set in place. The 2004
Final Notice states that a "[covered homeless organization] may use or
disclose PPI when required by law to the extent that the use or disclosure
complies with and is limited to the requirements of the law." 46 Likely,
this provision was included to prevent HUD's standards for disclosure
from preempting state law that imposed stronger privacy protections than
the federal ones. But because HUD's regulations allow disclosure "[t]o
provide or coordinate services to an individual," data contained in an
HMIS could lawfully be disclosed to a state official providing services to
the homeless.4 7 Once that data has been disclosed to a state official, it
could also be disclosed to the public if the state which the official worked
required disclosure of the information used to inform that public official,
since the 2004 Final Notice allows disclosure "when required by law." 48
Shortly after HUD released the Data and Technical Standards Final
Notice in 2004, a number of shelters that provided services to victims of
domestic violence voiced concern regarding the requirement that
domestic violence shelters also report information about their clients into
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id at 45928.
Id at 45927.
Id at 45889-90.
See generally id.
Id. at 45927.
Id. at 45928.
Id
Id.
Id
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an HMIS. 49 These shelters feared that disclosing the personal information
of the victims they served might compromise their clients' safety.50 In
response, HUD issued a clarification notice to address these concerns.
HUD stated that client information from domestic violence shelters was
essential to the overall initiative of creating an unduplicated count of
homelessness in America; however, these shelters were permitted to
encrypt the names and social security numbers of the individuals they
served." The clarification also removed the requirement that domestic
violence shelters share the information within HMIS with other
organizations, but they still must report the data to whomever the CoC
designated as the central agency collecting the data.5 2
Before discussing Florida's public record laws, it is necessary to first
examine a proposed rule that HUD released in 2011. While the 2004 Final
Notice articulates HUD's current privacy standards for HMIS, HUD
published a proposed rule in 2011 containing new privacy standards in
anticipation of a new Final Notice, the release of which is expected
sometime in 2015.5 Although the 2011 proposed rule does not carry the
weight of law, it is important to understand its new provisions because
HUD has made clear that the 2015 Final Notice will strongly resemble
the 2011 proposed rule.54
Although the 2011 proposed rule articulates a stronger emphasis on
protecting individuals' privacy than the 2004 rule, many of its provisions
remain unchanged. The 2011 proposed rule re-expresses Congress' intent
that all recipients of federal funding through the McKinney-Vento Act
must participate in HMIS, and that HUD is to ensure that all CoCs
participate in HMIS.ss However, unlike the 2004 Final Notice, the 2011
proposed rule explicitly mandates confidentiality of all "protected
identifying information.""6 The proposed rule goes on to define
"protected identifying information" as "information about a program
participant that can be used to distinguish or trace a program participant's
identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or identifying
information, using methods reasonably likely to be used, which is
49. See generally Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) Data and Technical
Standards Final Notice; Clarification and Additional Guidance on Special Provisions for
Domestic Violence Provider Shelters, 69 Fed. Reg. 61517-01 (Oct. 19, 2004).
50. See id
51. Id.at61518-19.
52. Id.
53.

Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH):

ProposedRulefor HMIS Requirements, HUD EXCHANGE (Dec. 2011), https://www.hudexchange.
info/resource/1967/hearth-proposed-rule-for-hmis-requirements/.
54. Id.
55. HMIS Requirements, supra note 28, at 76922, 76924 (proposed Dec. 9, 2011) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 91, 576, 580, and 583).
56. Id. at 76923.
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linkable to the program participant." 5 7
The proposed rule also orders HMIS users within each CoC to develop
a privacy policy for access to an HMIS."
At a minimum, the privacy policy must include data collection
limitations; purpose and use limitations; allowable uses and
disclosures; openness description; access and correction standards;
accountability standards; protections for victims of domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking; and such
additional information and standards as may be established by
HUD in notice. 5 9

'

Furthermore, these users "may not establish local standards for any
[organization] that contradicts, undermines, or interferes with the
implementation of an HMIS standards as prescribed in this part."6 o When
read with the mandate that all protected identifying information remains
confidential, the proposed rule would allow each CoC to implement its
own privacy policy so long as that privacy policy does not involve
disclosure of protected identifying information, because doing so would
"undermine ... the implementation of an HMIS standards." 6
The 2011 proposed rule also appears to be more sympathetic to
concerns over reporting personal information about victims of domestic
violence, and recognizes that many states have enacted laws to protect
this type of information. 62 Unlike the 2004 Final Notice, which requires
victim service providers to participate in HMIS after encrypting personal
information, the 2011 proposed rule states that "[v]ictim service
providers shall not directly enter or contribute data into an HMIS if they
are legally prohibited from participating in HMIS."6 3 Although exempt
from reporting information into an HMIS, if a service provider receives
funds from a program that requires HMIS participation, then the service
provider must still contribute data to a "comparable database instead." 64
While the 2011 proposed rule clearly articulates the importance of
confidentiality with regards to personally identifying information, CoCs
still have a vague obligation to comply with other state laws regarding
disclosure. Despite the stronger mandate that personally identifying
information remain private, the 2011 proposed rule repeats the 2004
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id at 76924.
Id at 76926.
Id
Id at 76925.
See also id at 76923, 76925.
See id. at 76925.
Id.
Id.
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.

requirement that CoCs must operate HMIS in accordance with any other
applicable federal or state law.6 5 The 2011 proposed rule then goes one
step further, perhaps recognizing the confusion that the 2004 Final Notice
created concerning federal preemption. HUD claims that the 20 11
proposed rule abides by Executive Order 13132, an executive order
prohibiting executive agencies from issuing any rule that has "federalism
implications." 66 HUD declared that the 2011 proposed rule carries no
"federalism implications," stating that "[t]his final rule does not . .
preempt state law within the meaning of the Executive Order." 67 When
read with Florida's liberal open government laws, this language could be
construed as contrary to HUD's privacy intentions. The 2011 proposed
rule states that "[s]ecurity standards, as provided in this section, are
directed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all
HMIS information; protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or
hazards to security; and ensure compliance by end users."68 However, if
a local or state law mandates disclosure, the 2011 proposed rule's
language as it stands would suggest that all CoCs abide by the local law.
"Written policies and procedures must comply with all applicable Federal
law and regulations, and applicable state or local governmental
requirements." Additionally, just like the 2004 Final Notice, HUD may
sanction any CoC for non-compliance with the proposed rule. 69
As the various privacy protections illustrate, HUD clearly understands
the importance of keeping homeless individuals' personal information
private. However, the problem with these standards is that they allow and
sometimes even encourage sharing this data with various local and state
agencies.7 0 While these data sharing provisions were likely intended to
do good by helping facilitate additional aid and services to homeless
individuals, HUD clearly did not contemplate the risk that providing
information to state officials could make an HMIS subject to state public
records laws. Both the 2004 Final Notice and the 2011 proposed rule not
65.
66.

Id. at 76924.
Id. at 76921-22.
Executive Order 13132 (entitled "Federalism") prohibits an agency from
publishing any rule that has federalism implications if the rule either imposes
substantial direct compliance costs on state and local governments and is not
required by statute, or the rule preempts state law, unless the agency meets the

consultation and funding requirements of section 6 of the Executive Order.
Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 76926.
69. Id. at 76927.
70. See generally HMIS, supranote 17, at 45888-45901; HMIS Requirements, supra note
28, at 76917-22.
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only allow disclosure to state officials, but also explicitly mandate that an
HMIS be disclosed when required by law. 7 ' And since the 2011 proposed
rule goes to great lengths to disclaim any "federalism implications," an
argument could be made that HUD's privacy protections were not
intended to preempt state law.7 2 Therefore, once a public official uses an
HMIS to coordinate services for an individual, the data within HMIS
could be considered a public record and thus subject to any disclosure
required by that state's law.
IV. FLORIDA'S OPEN GOVERNMENT

LAWS

Florida, perhaps more than most states, strongly values individuals'
right to access government records. As Florida Attorney General Pam
Bondi stated in the 2014 edition of the Government in the Sunshine
Manual, 73 "[w]e live in a state that values open government for its own
sake, and for that we should all be thankful."7 4 Chapter 119 of the Florida
Statutes, as well as Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution,
mandate public disclosure of all public records.7 5 All documents received
in connection with a public officer's official business are considered
public record subject to public disclosure. 7 6 Any document that is merely
received or used by a public official to "perpetuate, communicate, or
formalize knowledge," is subject to disclosure, even if the official who
received the document made no modification to it. 77 In fact, "received" is
not limited to situations where a public official physically possesses a
document. The First District Court of Appeal in National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Associated Press went so far as to extend the
definition of "received" to include instances in which a public official
merely views a document on a computer. 79 If there is any doubt as to
whether a document is a public record, courts are to resolve the ambiguity
71. See generally HMIS, supra note 17, at 45888-45901; HMIS Requirements, supra note
28, at 76917-77001.
72. See HMIS Requirements, supra note 28, at 76921-22.
73. The Government in the Sunshine Manual is a compilation of Florida laws, judicial
decisions, and Attorney General opinions regarding Florida's open government laws that the
Florida Attorney General's office releases each year. 36 FIRST AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE MANUAL 1 (2014), http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsflWF/

RMAS-9GNQTW/$file/2014SunshineLawManual.pdf [hereinafter SUNSHINE MANUAL].
74. Id.
75. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24; FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (2014).
76. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Associated Press, 18 So. 3d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2009).
77. Id. at 1207-08 (quoting Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379
So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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in favor of disclosure.8 0 Florida's policy is specifically intended for courts
to take a liberal approach in determining what documents are considered
public records for the purpose of disclosure. 8 1
Florida takes an equally liberal approach in defining which entities are
subject to the open government laws. Statutes define an "agency" subject
to Florida's open government laws as:
[A]ny state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer,
department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate
unit of government created or established by law including, for the
purposes of this chapter, the Commission on Ethics, the Public
Service Commission, and the Office of Public Counsel, and any
other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or
business entity acting on behalf of any public agency. 8 2
However, only the "custodian of the public record" is responsible for
responding to public records requests. 3 While Florida law requires
anyone who has custody over a public record to permit its inspection by
the general public, custody means more than temporary possession of a
document.84 "In order to have custody, one must have supervision and
control over the document or have legal responsibility for its care,
keeping or guardianship."8 1 So while a public official merely viewing a
document in the capacity of that official's job makes that document a
public record, it does not necessarily levy the duty of disclosure upon that

official.
The narrowly tailored definition of "custody," however, does not in
any way limit disclosure. As the plain language of the statute implies,
"any person" is not limited to a government agency or employee, but
rather any person or private organization in possession of a public
record.8 1 "It makes no difference that the records in question are in the
hands of a private party. If they are public records, they are subject to
compelled disclosure under the law." 8 Therefore, Florida courts' liberal
statutory interpretation of what constitutes a public record, agency, and
custodian under Chapter 119 means thatjust about any document that any
government employee comes into contact with will be considered a
public record subject to disclosure, regardless of whether a government
80. Id. at 1206.
81. Id

§

82.

FLA. STAT.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (2012).
Mintus v. City of W. Palm Beach, 711 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Id.
See Nat'1 CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, 18 So. 3d at 1208.
Id. at 1209-10.
Id. at 1210.

119.011(2) (2012).
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organization or employee created or has physical possession of it.
Access to public records in Florida is a fundamental right.8 9
Proponents of Florida's open government laws argue that Florida's broad
laws promote transparency, accountability, truth, and fairness. 90 These
objectives outweigh any potential harm that could be caused to an
individual's privacy through the release of a government record. 9 ' In fact,
the Florida Constitution unambiguously values the people's right to
access public records more than the people's right of privacy. 92 While the
Florida Constitution provides a right of privacy for individuals "to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life,"
this right "shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to
public records and meetings as provided by law." 93 Even if an agency
believes that disclosure of a public record could have harmful effects, the
agency must disclose the record once a public records request is made
unless a specific statutory exemption applies.94
Courts have no power to create an exemption to Florida's open
government laws. 95 The legislature is the only branch able to enact an
exemption, and courts narrowly construe any exemptions that may
apply. 9 6 Furthermore, if any public officer knowingly violates section
119.07(1), Florida Statutes, that individual commits a first-degree
misdemeanor and could be suspended or even fired from his job. 97
Access to public records is so vital to the State of Florida that, in
addition to government agencies having virtually no power to limit access
to information not specifically exempted by statute, agencies also have
no power to regulate the public records requests themselves. Any person,
regardless of citizenship or criminal record, may view a public record. 98
Requests to view public records do not need to be made in writing, and
an agency may not demand that the requests be written. 99 An agency may
89.

Rhea v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Santa Fe Coll., 109 So. 3d 851, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

90.

SUNSHINE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 1.

91.

See Williams v. City ofMinneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) ("[N]either

a custodian of records nor a person who is the subject of a record can claim a constitutional right

of privacy as a bar to requested inspection of a public record which is in the hands of a government
agency.").
92. See FLA. CONST. art. II,

§ 23.

93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Gannett Corp., Inc. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
95. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Palm Beach Cnty. v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001).
96. See id.; see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Associated Press, 18 So. 3d 1201,
1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (emphasizing Florida courts' policy of favoring disclosure whenever
there is any doubt as to whether the disclosure is appropriate).

97.
98.
99.
3d DCA

FLA. STAT. § 119.10(1)(b) (2014).
See FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (2014).
See Dade Aviation Consultants v. Knight Ridder, Inc., 800 So. 2d 302, 305 n.l (Fla.
2001).
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not refuse to comply with a public records request on the grounds that
another agency or entity is also responsible for maintaining the records.10 0
Agencies are even required to comply with public records requests that
they believe are overly broad.' 0 1
Furthermore, the person requesting access to the public records may
remain completely anonymous:
A person requesting access to or copies of public records,
therefore, . . . may not be required to disclose his name, address,
telephone number or the like to the custodian, unless the custodian
is required by law to obtain this information prior to releasing the
records.1 0 2
Accordingly, an agency may not require the requestor to disclose his
or her identity before allowing inspection and copying of a public
record. 1 0 3 The requesting party also does not need to demonstrate a
legitimate or noncommercial interest in the public record, and Florida
courts have consistently held that the requesting party's interest is
irrelevant.1 0 4
Although the limited restrictions enable broad access to public
records, this policy could lead to improper use of information contained
within a public record. If public records are released in accordance with
a public records request, any individuals harmed by the government's
release of the public records have virtually no remedy available to
them. 0 5 Therefore, in order to protect against those with nefarious
intentions, the Florida Legislature has exempted certain forms of
sensitive information from disclosure.1 0 6 This Article focuses on
exemptions that may apply to information within an HMIS.
Aside from Florida's ban on disclosure of social security numbers,
none of the statutorily defined exemptions clearly and unambiguously

100.

SUNSHINE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 138.

101.

See Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330, 1332 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

102.

SUNSHINE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 141.

103. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla 91-76, at 3 (1991); Bevan v. Wanicka, 505 So.2d 1116, 1118 (Fla.
2d DCA 1987) (the Public Records Act does not condition the inspection of public records on any
requirement that the person seeking to inspect records reveal that person's background
information).

104. See, e.g., Curry v. State, 811 So. 2d 736, 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
105. Cf Williams v. City ofMinneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding
that "neither the Public Records Act nor the Florida Constitution grants a custodian protection
against tort liability resulting from that person's intentionally communicating public records ...
to someone outside the agency ... unless ... the person inspecting the records has made a bona

fide request to inspect them, in accordance with the Public Records Act. . . .") (second emphasis
added)).
106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.071(5)(a)1.b. (2014).
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apply to an HMIS.10 7 Florida law specifically exempts some material
regarding victims of domestic violence, but only in limited circumstances
depending on the recipient of the information. For example, "reports of
abused children or vulnerable adults which are received by the
Department of ChildrenandFamilies (DCF) are confidential and exempt
from disclosure," 0 8 and "[t]he addresses, telephone numbers, and social
security numbers ofparticipants in the Address ConfidentialityProgram
for Victims ofDomestic Violence are exempt from disclosure .. . ."109
Patient health records are also exempt from disclosure in limited
circumstances, depending on the source of the health records. Records
generated by hospitals and surgical facilities are exempt from
disclosure."l 0 Records held by the Department of Health are also exempt,
as well as the medical records of recipients of nursing home services.III
Individuals receiving substance abuse services also have a right to
confidentiality in the records pertaining to their identity, diagnosis, and
prognosis.11 2 However, similar to the other provisions regarding health
record exemptions, the statute's language here applies only to service
providers' records, which Florida law defines as an agency licensed under
Chapter 397, FloridaStatutes."13
Florida laws exempt from disclosure any information that may reveal
the identity of a victim of either child abuse or of a sexual offense, but
only if it is contained within "criminal intelligence information" or
"criminal investigative information."'' 4 Although Florida law broadly
defines "criminal intelligence information" to include any information
about an identifiable person that was collected to "anticipate, prevent, or
monitor possible criminal activity," it is limited to information "collected
by a criminal justice agency." 15
Nearly all of the information exempted from disclosure is narrowly
tailored to only apply to information from a specific source. In fact, the
open government laws contain no general, all-encompassing exemption
for individuals' personally identifying information.11 6 Despite the lack of
a broad protection, these specific exemptions still show that the Florida
Legislature understands the potential danger in releasing individuals'
personal information to the public. However, once something becomes a
107.
108.
39.202(1),
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See § 119.071.
SUNSHINE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 71 (emphasis added) (citing FLA. STAT.
415.107(1) (2012)).
Id. at 74 (emphasis added) (citing FLA. STAT. § 741.465(1) (2012)).
FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(8) (2014).
FLA. STAT. § 400.022(1)(m) (2014).
FLA. STAT. § 397.501(7)(a) (2009).
FLA. STAT. §§ 397.311(33), § 397.501(7)(a).
FLA. STAT. § 119.071(21)(h) (2014).
FLA. STAT. § Il9.011(3)(a) (2014).
see FLA. STAT. § 119.071.
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public record, the courts' narrow construction of the statutorily defined
exemptions, combined with the preference for disclosure, likely means
that the privacy protections currently in place are not enough to exempt
the information contained within an HMIS from disclosure.
V. HMIS' PROTECTIONS ARE TOO WEAK-FLORIDA'S OPEN
GOVERNMENT LAWS LIKELY MANDATE DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN HMIS
Florida's public records laws create a substantial risk that personal
information in an HMIS could be released to the public if a public records
request is made. Not all HMIS information would be subject to Chapter
119 disclosure, as some pieces of information contained within an HMIS,
like individuals' social security numbers, are explicitly exempt from
disclosure under Florida's open government laws." 7 However, it is
unclear whether exemptions for information contained within other
public records would also apply to exempt the same information
contained within an HMIS. These exemptions seem to depend on the
source of that information. For example, certain medical records
belonging to "a participant in a . .. local housing assistance program,"

are exempt from disclosure." 8 However, it is unclear who would qualify
under this language and whether this provision is limited to organizations
providing "housing assistance." 1 9 Although there is no case law directly
on point, the courts' policy of narrowly interpreting public records
exemptions likely means that these exemptions will not apply to an
HMIS.
Even if the various medical records exemptions apply to some of an
HMIS information, they are still largely inadequate, because the statutory
language would likely prohibit broad application to all organizations that
report data into an HMIS. For example, some organizations providing
117.
118.

See FLA. STAT. § 19.071(5)(a)1.b. (2014).
FLA. STAT. § 119.071(5)(f).
Medical history records ... provided to ... a county, a municipality, or a local
housing finance agency by an applicant for or a participant in a federal, state, or
local housing assistance program are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1)
and s. 24(a), Art. I ofthe State Constitution. Governmental entities or their agents
shall have access to such confidential and exempt records and information for
the purpose of auditing federal, state, or local housing programs or housing
assistance programs.

Id. Additionally, it is unclear whether an institution that provides services to homeless individuals
would be even considered a "service provider" for the purposes of Florida's other healthcare
records exemptions. See SUNSHINE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 82-85.

119.

See FLA. STAT.

§ 119.071(5)(f) (2014).
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substance abuse counseling would be considered "service providers"
within the meaning of section 397.311(33), FloridaStatutes.120 However,
many organizations participating in an HMIS provide other services to
homeless individuals and thus fall outside of the statute's protections; yet,
these programs must still collect medical information to report within
HMIS.121 The same problem arises within the context of information
related to the victim of a sexual offense. While any information that could
reveal the identity of a victim of a sexual offense is exempt from Article
I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution and from section 119.07(1),
Florida Statutes, this exemption is limited to information collected by a
criminal justice agency.1 22 Thus, even if these exemptions protect some
of the information within an HMIS from disclosure, the narrowly tailored
language of the exemptions would still leave the vast majority of HMIS
participants' information outside the scope of their protection.
Therefore, aside from the limited amount of information specifically
exempt from disclosure, the privacy protections in HUD's 2004 HMIS
Data and Technical Standards Final Notice and 2011 Proposed Rule
would likely not prevent disclosure if an HMIS information is considered
a public record for the purposes of Florida's open government laws.
Despite HUD's emphasis on privacy, the First District Court of Appeal's
opinion in Nat'1 CollegiateAthletic Ass'n v. Associated Presscould cause
an HMIS to be considered a public record for the purposes of disclosure
once it is used to inform a public official.1 23 HMIS could be used to
inform a public official, for example, if the state hired a social worker to
assist homeless individuals in finding work and housing.1 24 A public
official fearing sanctions for nondisclosure of HMIS data would likely
rely on the language contained in section 4.1.3 of HUD's 2004 Final
Notice, which states that "[a] CHO [(covered homeless organization)]
may use or disclose PPI when required by law to the extent that the use
or disclosure complies with and is limited to the requirements of the
law."l 25
However, disclosing HMIS records pursuant to Florida's public
records laws would seemingly run counter to the entire purpose of the
congressionally-mandated privacy protections, as HUD's HMIS security
guidelines and the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 11360a(f)(3) clearly
120. See FLA. STAT. § 397.311(33) (2014); Fla. Admin. Code R. 65D-30.002(19).
121. See FLA. STAT. § 397.311(33); HMIS, supra note 17, at 45896.
122. See FLA. STAT. § 119.071(2)(a), (2)(h)1.b.; see also FLA. STAT. § 119.011(3)(a)-()-(c)2
(2014) (defining criminal intelligence information).
123. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Associated Press, 18 So. 3d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2009).
124. Using HMIS in this way was clearly contemplated by HUD, as HUD expressly
authorizes this. See HMIS, supra note 17, at 45928. The 2004 HMIS Final Notice allows
disclosure "[t]o provide or coordinate services to an individual." Id.
125. See id.
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articulate an intention to keep personal information secure from
unwarranted public disclosure. 126 In fact, the revisions contained in the
2004 HMIS Final Notice were written specifically in response to public
concern over whether HUD was adequately protecting clients' personal
information.1 27 Furthermore, this conflict between Florida law and
HUD's regulations puts homeless service providers in a difficult position,
because disclosing personal information pursuant to Florida's public
records laws would likely put a CoC at risk of being sanctioned by
HUD.1 2 8 HUD may reduce or terminate a grant to a CoC if they are found
in violation of any program requirement.1 2 9 Because HMIS is a CoC
program, and 24 C.F.R. § 578.7(b) mandates participation in HMIS in
accordance with HUD's privacy guidelines, which require limited
3
a blanket disclosure exemption of all personal
disclosure of PPI,"'
information may result in a loss of funds for the CoC.
In summary, Florida's open government laws stand as a substantial
obstacle to HUD's privacy and security standards for an HMIS. Once a
public official views an HMIS, it likely becomes a public record subject
to disclosure. While Florida law protects certain personal information
from disclosure, these exemptions largely do not apply to an HMIS.
Many of the potentially relevant exemptions would not protect the
information contained within an HMIS because these exemptions
narrowly apply to information from specific sources of which an HMIS
does not meet the definition. In the few circumstances where an HMIS
might qualify for a disclosure exemption, the exemptions are still
inadequate because they only protect a very limited amount of
information. If the personal information contained within an HMIS is left
unprotected, a criminal could make a public records request to view this
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 1360a(f)(3)(D) (2012); see generally HMIS, supra note 17, at 45927
(The standards seek to protect the confidentiality of personal information while allowing for
reasonable, responsible, and limited uses and disclosures of data).
127. HMIS, supra note 17, at 45890. HUD's response to the public comment period reflects
their intent to address these concerns and prevent unwarranted disclosure. "[W]ithout adequate

safeguards, providing data to an HMIS could put a homeless person at risk .... HUD is committed
to working with CoCs to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place so that information collected

through HMIS is protected." Id. "As in other areas involving sensitive or protected client
information, information should be recorded only when a program or project has adequate data

confidentiality protections." Id. at 45902. "All identifying information ...

need[s] to have special

protections to ensure the data [is] unusable by casual viewers. HMIS user access to this

information will be highly restricted." Id. at 45905.
128. See 24 C.F.R. § 578.107(a)(3) (2015).
129. Id. § 578.107(b)(7).
130. See also id § 578.7(b)(3,5) (stating "The Continuum of Care must ... [e]nsure the
HMIS is administered in compliance with requirements prescribed by HUD."); HMIS, supra note
17, at 45927 (stating "These standards seek to protect the confidentiality of information, while
allowing for reasonable, responsible, and limited uses and disclosures of data." (emphasis
added)).
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information and then use the personal information to commit identity
fraud. Therefore, HUD or the Florida Legislature need to take immediate
action to prevent this from happening.
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

There are three potential solutions to the conflict between HUD's
HMIS privacy protections and Florida's open government laws: (1)
federal preemption, (2) creation of new express exemptions, and (3)
alteration of the data collected. First, although HUD's HMIS privacy and
security standards lack explicit language stating so, the agency's
regulations may preempt Florida's open government laws. If the privacy
and security standards as they exist now are not enough to preempt
Florida law, HUD could include explicit preemption language in the next
update of its standards. Alternatively, the Florida Legislature could create
an exemption to public records disclosure for the information contained
within an HMIS. Lastly, HUD could amend the information that service
providers are required to enter into an HMIS database, excluding
unnecessary personal information, or could require that all personal
information be encrypted.
VII. SOLUTION 1: FEDERAL PREEMPTION

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates that federal
law reign supreme over state law. 13 1 However, in order for the Supremacy
Clause to apply, the federal government must manifest an intention to
preempt state law.1 32 Courts begin with the assumption of the federal
government does not intend to supersede the states' police powers unless
Congress manifests a clear intent to do so.133 However, "Congress may
indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute's express language or
through its structure and purpose." 1 3 4 Still, implied preemption of state
law must also be narrowly construed, especially when the area in question
is traditionally regulated by the states.1 35 Courts have found clear
congressional intent to preempt state regulations where Congress
eliminated a term that mandated subservience to state laws and replaced
it with language stipulating that an executive agency conferred exclusive
131. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
132. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). "'[T]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
133. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
134. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (emphasis added).
135. Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70, 77-78 (Fla. 2011).
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authority over all persons licensed under the regulation.1 3 6 When more
than one interpretation of a federal law regulating in an area usually
governed by the states is available, courts will generally rule against
preemption.
Federal law will preempt state law in three circumstances: "(1) where
express federal statutory language so provides; (2) where federal law has
so thoroughly occupied a legislative field as to create a reasonable
inference that there is no room for the state to supplement it; or (3) where
a state law conflicts with a federal law."' 3 8 Preemption analysis applies
equally to federal agencies as "[f]ederal regulations have no less
preemptive effect than federal statutes."l 3 9 Federal law will even preempt
a state's constitution, if the state constitution creates an unavoidable
conflict with the federal law in question. 4 0
Federal law will supersede state law when the federal statute or
regulation contains an express preemption clause. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the plain text of a statute or regulation contains the
best evidence of congressional intent.14 1 Accordingly, a law must contain
precise and unambiguous language in order to qualify as an express
preemption.1 4 2 The rules established by the Secretary of HUD regarding
privacy protections in an HMIS do not contain an express preemption of
records, other than clients' medical records, but even that will only
expressly preempt Florida's open government laws if the information is
explicitly covered by HIPAA. 1 4 3
Courts have found that the statutory language contained within

&

136. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 232-33 (1947).
137. Altria, 555 U.S. at 77.
138. Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Trust, 112 So. 3d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 2013).
139. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting Fid. Fed. Say.
Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982)).
140. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964); see also Rios v. Direct Mail Express, Inc.,
435 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205-06 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (stating that there is no distinction between
federal preemption of a state statute and a state constitution).
141. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Rosado, 112 So. 3d at
1167.
142. See Altria, 555 U.S. at 78. For example, the Court in Altria found that language stating
"[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . shall be imposed under State law" created an express
preemption. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006)).
143. See generallyHMIS, supra note 17, at 45928.
Any [covered homeless. organization] that is covered under the HIPAA is not
required to comply with the privacy or security standards in this Notice if the
[covered homeless organization] determines that a substantial portion of its
[personally protected information] about homeless clients or homeless
individuals is protected health information as defined in the HIPAA rules.
Id.
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HIPAA constitutes an express preemption.144 In OPIS Management
Resources, the United States. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
found that HIPAA expressly preempted state laws that provided less
stringent privacy protections than those provided by HIPAA.1 45 HIPAA's
language clearly articulates the congressional intent to preempt state law
by stating that "a provision or requirement under this part . . . shall
supersede any contrary provision of State law." 1 4 6 HUD's regulations
likely create an express exemption for health related information, as long
as the service provider constitutes a "covered entity" under HIPAA.1 4 7
Any CHO that is covered under the HIPAA is not required to
comply with the privacy or security standards in this Notice if the
CHO determines that a substantial portion of its [personally
identifying information] about homeless clients or homeless
individuals is protected health information as defined in the
HIPAA rules.1 4 8
Therefore, because HUD's regulations explicitly state that HIPAA
applies to protected health information and HIPAA expressly preempts
state law, courts will likely find this to be an express preemption for the
service providers that qualify under HIPAA. While this clearly exempts
"covered entities" from disclosure as required by Florida's open
government laws, many homeless service providers are not the type of
medical facility which would qualify as a "covered entity" under
HIPPA.14 9 Furthermore, even if a homeless service provider qualifies as
a "covered entity," this only resolves the issue of clients' medical records,
and therefore would not protect non-medical personal information
contained within an HMIS.
144. OPIS Mgmt. Res., LLC v. Sec'y, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 713 F.3d 1291,
1294 (11th Cir. 2013).
145. See id.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (1996).
147. See HMIS, supra note 17, at 45928.
148. Id.
149. See 45 U.S.C.C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). HIPAA defines a "covered entity" as "[a] health
plan .

.

. [a] health care clearinghouse . . ." or "[a] health care provider who transmits any health

information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter." Id.
A "health care provider" for the purposes of defining a "covered entity" includes a provider of
services as defined by 42 U.S.C § 1395x(u), a provider of "health services" as defined by 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(s), or anyone who furnishes health care bills "in the normal course of business."
Id. (defining provider of services as "a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility,
comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health agency, hospice program, or . . a
fund" including, for example, physician services, other services, and supplies incident to a
physician's services, hospital services, certain diagnostic services, and various treatments for
specific diseases or anyone who furnishes healthcare bills in their normal course of business. A
provider of homeless services almost certainly does not fit this definition.).
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HUD's HMIS confidentiality regulations likely do not preempt
Florida's public records laws through the doctrine of field preemption
either. Courts have found federal acts to preempt state law, even absent
express language stating so, when federal interests are so dominant within
a given field that it is clear that the federal government intended to
preempt the entire field of regulation.so Thus, field preemption applies
when the federal government has enacted a pervasive regulatory scheme
which "le[aves] no room" for the states to legislate within a given area or

'

field.' 5

Strong federal regulatory presence, however, does not automatically
create preemption of an entire field. When the federal government is
aware of state law within a given field and considers its operation in
concurrence with federal law, courts are reluctant to apply field
preemption.152 "The case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak
where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law
in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them."' 5 3
Accordingly, when Congress establishes a minimum requirement barring
less restrictive state standards but allowing for stricter state rules above
the floor set by the federal law, courts have ruled that field preemption
does not apply, though a state rule that falls below the statutory floor
would likely give rise to a conflict preemption claim (discussed in the
next section).1 5 4 For example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District Court of New York found that Congress, in establishing
minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), did not
intend to preempt the entire field of labor law, since the FLSA allowed
for more protective state standards above the floor set by the federal
regulations. 5 5
Furthermore, courts are reluctant to infer field preemption solely

150. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984).
151. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70, 76 (Fla. 2011).
152. See Hughes v. Crist, 377 F.3d 1258, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2004). In Hughes, the court
denied Defendants' petition to enjoin the State of Florida from prosecuting state crime of
operating an aircraft under the influence of alcohol, despite substantial federal statutes and
regulations governing the field of pilot safety, because federal regulations allowed for State law
enforcement to investigate similar prohibited conduct. Id.
153. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)). In Wyeth, the Court
found that Congress did not intend for FDA to preempt state regulation of prescription drug
warnings, despite FDA's preemption claims, because Congress itself did not believe state tort law
to be an obstacle to its overall objectives. Id.
154. See DeSilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 497,
517-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
15 5. Id.
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through the existence of comprehensive federal regulations promulgated
by a federal agency.1 56 Because most agency regulations are more
comprehensive than statutes, courts require clear intent from the agency
that their regulations are to be exclusive.'1 5 "[I]f an agency does not speak
to the question of pre-emption, [courts] will pause before saying that the
mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency
did in fact intend to pre-empt."' 5 8
The Supreme Court, however, routinely applies field preemption to
strike down state laws that would otherwise undermine the federal
government's constitutionally mandated duties, such as conducting
foreign policy and regulating citizenship.' 5 9 It is important to note that in
both instances the Supreme Court cited to the federal government's
extensive statutory regulation in the area of foreign affairs as evidence of
the federal government's intent to occupy the field.1 60 Additionally, the
Court has stated that requiring the federal government to operate in
compliance with conflicting state laws would undermine the federal
government's control over its comprehensive regulatory scheme.161
HUD's HMIS confidentiality regulations likely do not preempt
Florida's public record laws through the doctrine of implied field
preemption. The comprehensive nature of an HMIS regulations are likely
not enough on their own to show intent to preempt the entire field of
HMIS privacy protections, as federal regulations are usually more
comprehensive than statutes and therefore must show a clear intent to
preempt state laws.1 62 HUD's HMIS guidelines do not show a clear intent
to preempt the entire field of privacy regulations, as the plain language of
both the guidelines and relevant CFR declare that state laws regarding
privacy and disclosure also apply to HUD's confidentiality
requirement.1 6 3 Such language clearly recognizes that state law exists
alongside the federal regulations of an HMIS.1 64
Additionally, HUD's HMIS regulations are analogous to the
minimum wage laws contained within the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 65
156. See Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985).
157. Id at 718.
15 8. Id.
159. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376-77 (2000); see also
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
160. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374.
161. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377.
162. See Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. at 717-18. See generally HMIS, supra note 17,
at 45888.
163. See generally HMIS, supra note 17, at 45888; see also 24 C.F.R. § 578.103(d)(2)
(2015).
164. See Wyeth v. Levine, U.S. 555, 575 (2009).
165. See DeSilva, v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 497,
517-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Just like the FLSA, the plain language contained within the Final Notice
articulates that state laws are only allowed if they provide more protection
than the federal laws, not less.
This two-tiered approach recognizes the broad diversity of
organizations that participate in HMIS and the differing
programmatic and organizational realities that may demand a
higher standard for some activities. Some organizations (e.g., such
as those serving victims of domestic violence) may choose to
implement higher levels of privacy and security standards because
of the nature of their homeless population and/or service provision.
Others (e.g., large emergency shelters) may find the higher
standards overly burdensome or impractical. At a minimum,
however, all organizations must meet the baseline privacy and
security requirements described in this section. This approach
provides a uniform floor of protection for homeless clients with
the possibility of additional rotections for organizations with
additional needs or capacities. 6
Though HUD has made its intent clear to leave no room for the states
to legislate protections less than HUD's, because of the guidelines'
continued use of language indicating coexistence with state laws, HUD
likely did not intend to occupy the entire field of HMIS confidentiality.
However, since requiring adherence to lesser state confidentiality
standards would completely undermine the purpose for the protections in
the first place, preemjtion on the basis of conflict would likely prove the
strongest argument.
HUD's HMIS regulations should preempt Florida's public records
law through the doctrine of implied conflict preemption. As with any
form of preemption, implied conflict preemption will not occur unless
there is a clear intention from the federal government to preempt
conflicting state laws.1 6 8 Intent to preempt is shown, for the purposes of
implied conflict preemption, when there exists either an actual conflict
between the federal and state laws in question, or an instance where the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."l 6 9 "If the purpose of the
act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen
field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural
effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the
166.
167.
168.
169.
(quoting

HMIS, supra note 17, at 45888 (emphasis added).
See DeSilva, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
See Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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sphere of its delegated power." 7 0
An actual conflict occurs when it is impossible to comply with both
the federal and state laws.' 7 ' Courts will find an impossibility if both laws
cannot be enforced "without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field." 72 Conflict also occurs when one law punishes what another law
permits. 7 3 In Kent, the Northern District of California explained that an
actual conflict occurs when "an action brought under state law would, in
effect, have penalized a defendant for conduct that an agency, acting
pursuant to a federal law .. . determined should be permitted."' 74
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Counsel, the Supreme Court
ruled that a Massachusetts law restricting trade with Burma stood "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full objectives" under a
federal act granting the President sole discretion over sanctions with
Burma.' 7 5 The court reasoned that the state law stood as an obstacle to
the federal law by penalizing private action that the federal act otherwise
permitted.1 76 "Conflict is imminent when two separate remedies are
brought to bear on the same activity." 77 Additionally, the court found
that if the state law was enforceable, the federal government would have
less power in enforcing its policy, and thus the state law stood "in clear
contrast to the congressional scheme." 7 8
Furthermore, where Congress creates a minimum standard that leaves
room for states to supplement the federal law with additional protections,
but instead state legislation allows for action below the floor set by
Congress, the state law would create a substantial obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress's original intentions, and thus conflict
preemption would apply.1 79 Courts have consistently found this to be true
in the context of state laws that conflict with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 180 IDEA enforced its mandate that all
children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education by
170. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
171. Smith, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.
172. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
173. See Kent v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1217 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
174. Id.
175. Crosby, 530 U.S.at 373.
176. Id. at 376.
177. Id. at 380.
178. Id at 377-78.
179. See DeSilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 497,
517-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). But where Congress creates a floor, state legislation above the federal
requirement does not stand in the way of the federal objective. See Frank Bros., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't
of Transp., 409 F.3d 880, 895 (7th Cir. 2005).
180. See Converse Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Two v. Pratt, 993 F. Supp. 848, 855 (D. Wyo. 1997);
see also Antkowiak ex rel. Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 1988); Evans v.
Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
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setting minimum requirements that all local agencies receiving federal
aid must follow.' 8 ' If any state legislation were to provide standards that
fall below the floor set by IDEA, federal law would preempt the state
policies.' 8 2
HUD's HMIS regulations should preempt Florida's public records
law through the doctrine of implied conflict preemption because the
penalties both laws carry for non-compliance make abiding by both a
physical impossibility, and the Florida public record laws stand as an
obstacle to HUD's guidelines by providing less protections for P11 than
the federal act permits. Since both HUD's regulations and Florida's
public records laws provide penalties for non-compliance, it is impossible
to comply with both.' 8 3 Anyone who knowingly violates the Sunshine
Law faces criminal charges.1 84 However, if any organization does not
comply with HUD's regulations, they are also subject to sanctions.'
Releasing the personal information within HMIS pursuant to the
Sunshine Laws would fall below HUD's floor for privacy protections,
and thus render one in violation of both HUD's HMIS regulations and
Congress's mandate that all personal information pertaining to a CoC be
kept confidential.1 8 6 Additionally, all recipients of McKinney-Vento Act
funds are required to participate in HMIS, and participation in HMIS
requires adherence to HMIS' privacy regulations."' Because conflict
preemption occurs when the state or federal government punishes actions
that the other permits, abiding by the Sunshine Laws in violation of
HMIS' regulations would render an organization ineligible for
McKinney-Vento aid.' 8 8
Florida's public record laws also "stand as an obstacle" to HUD's
privacy protections by allowing disclosure of personal information below
the floor set by an HMIS regulations. Disclosing the personally
identifiable data within HMIS pursuant to a state requirement would
clearly fall below the floor set by HUD pursuant to Congressional

181. Evans, 818 F. Supp. at 1218.
182. Converse, 993 F. Supp. at 855; Evans, 818 F. Supp. at 1223. "IDEA does not preempt
state law if the state standards meet the minimum federal guidelines. However, IDEA 'does

preempt state law if the state standards are below the federal minimum."' Id. (quoting Amelia
Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp. 899, 893-94 (E.D. Va. 1987)).
183. See 24 C.F.R. § 578.107 (2015); see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74; Smith, v.
Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1260 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
184.

FLA. STAT.

§

119.10 (2004).

185. See 24 C.F.R. § 578.107 (2015).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 11360a(f)(3)(D) (2014); see also 24 C.F.R. § 578.103(b) (2015);
HMIS, supranote 17, at 45888.
187. See HMIS, supra note 17, at 45888.
188. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380; see also Kent v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d
1208, 1217 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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delegation.18 9 Though HUD's regulations provide for disclosure "when
required by law," doing so pursuant to Florida's Sunshine Laws would
stand at odds with Congress's and the Secretary's intent. 190 Because "the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption
case," the relevant statutes, code, and guidelines explicitly state an
intention to keep personal information private, and courts have repeatedly
held that the plain meaning of the language employed is evidence of
intent, acting pursuant to Florida's public record laws would stand as a
substantial obstacle to the federal interest of protecting clients' personal
information, regardless of the notice's "when required by law"
provision.' 9 1
HUD could also completely avoid the complex conflict preemption
analysis by expressly preempting any state disclosure laws that would
result in less privacy protections than those currently in place. It would
also be wise for HUD to remove its statement that an HMIS privacy
standards comply with Executive Order 13132. Although courts have
interpreted compliance with Executive Order 13132 to be unreviewable
and only intended to "improve the internal management of executive
branch,"' 9 2 removing it from the privacy standards would eliminate any
doubt about whether HUD intends to preempt lesser state standards.
Clearing up the ambiguity in the anticipated 2015 Final Notice would go
a long way in preventing a clash between HUD's standards and Florida's
open government laws, but the better solution would be for Florida to
create an express exemption for an HMIS.
VIII. SOLUTION 2: CREATE AN

HMIS

EXEMPTION TO THE

SUNSHINE LAWS

Disclosing homeless individual's personal information, pursuant to
Florida's public records laws in no way furthers the state's goal of
promoting transparency, accountability, truth, and fairness. Therefore,
the Florida legislature should create an express exemption to Chapter 119
disclosure for the personal information contained within an HMIS.
Florida's existing exemptions for personal information from certain
medical records, identifying information of sex crime victims contained
in police reports, and blanket social security number exemption show that
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 11360a(f)(3) (2014); 24 C.F.R. § 576.500(x) (2015); HMIS, supra note
17, at 45888.
190. See HMIS, supra note 17, at 45888.
191. See id.; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485; (1996) (quoting Retail
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70,75 (Fla. 2011).
192. See, e.g., Valentine Props. Assocs., LP v. U.S. Dep't of Housing Hous. & Urban Dev.,
785 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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the legislature has clearly contemplated the detrimental effects of
disclosing that sort of information to the public. Moreover, Florida
legislatures have found less defensible reasons for enacting even more
specific exemptions than a potential exemption for personal information
of homeless persons within a federal database. Florida law currently
protects all information pertaining to pawn broker transactions turned
over to the police,' 93 all personal information contained within an
application for a concealed firearm permit,1 94 and all personal
information related to the payment of a highway toll' 9 5 from disclosure
pursuant to a public records request. In light of these provision, surely an
exemption to protect the identity of Florida's most vulnerable citizens
would be worthy of legislation.
IX. SOLUTION

3: COLLECT LESS

INFORMATION WITHIN AN

HMIS

Even if HUD made it clear that its privacy standards were to preempt
lesser state laws, and the Florida legislature also created an express
exemption to the Sunshine Laws for an HMIS, personal information
could still be disseminated through a computer hack or even human
mistake. Therefore, unquestionably the best solution to an HMIS privacy
dilemma would be for HUD to simply collect less data from homeless
shelters on the persons they serve. HMIS is founded largely upon
Congress' desire to have an unduplicated count of homeless individuals
in America and learn more about America's homeless population in
general.1 96 But HUD could accomplish those goals without collecting
some of the information that it does, and thus remove any risk from
accidental disclosure.
Social security numbers are not necessary to create an unduplicated
count of homeless individuals in America, because each individual that
receives homeless services is assigned a PIN for that same reason.1 9 7 The
use of a PIN is also better at achieving this end. As HUD explains, "[t]he
PIN is the only identifier that is guaranteed to be present and unique for
each client served. A client may not have or may not know their SSN,
while other identifying information such as name may be the same as
another client's."'9 8 Because most homeless shelters are authorized to
access one another's inputted information, it could be easily determined

193.
194.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 539.003 (2014).
§ 790.0601(1) (2014).

195. FLA. STAT. § 338.155(6) (2014).
196. HMIS, supra note 17, at 45888.
197. Id. at 45909-10.
198. Id. at 45909.
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whether someone has already been assigned a PIN.1 99 In fact, the 2004
Notice mandates that CoC program staff determine whether a client has
already been assigned a PIN at intake by performing a search using the
individual's name, social security number, date of birth, and gender. 2 0 0
But HUD does not need individual social security numbers to achieve this
purpose, as HUD's collection of individual's names and dates of birth are
all that is necessary to ensure that an individual does not receive more
than one PIN. When assigning a PIN at intake, HMIS users could merely
search for a person's name, and if more than one name came up, they
could ascertain whether this person already has a PIN by using their
DOB.2 0 1
In defense of its policy of collecting social security numbers, HUD
explains that, while "[n]ame and date of birth are useful unique identifiers
. . . these identifiers by themselves do not facilitate as accurate an
unduplicated count of homeless persons as using [social security
numbers] since names change and people share the same date of birth."2 0 2
Essentially, HUD claims, there are instances where names and dates of
birth alone cannot be trusted, and so use of the social security number is
necessary. 2 0 3 However, this logic ignores the very rationale for assigning
individuals a PIN. Social security numbers cannot always be trusted
either since, as the 2004 Final Notice contemplates, not everyone who
receives homeless services knows their social security number in the first
place. 2 0 4 While it is theoretically true that an individual could change their
name in between receiving services from one CoC program to the next
and share the same birthday as a hypothetical person with an identical
name, common sense would seem to indicate that these situations must
be few and far between.
As an alternative to performing a database search, HUD could merely
ask a recipient of services whether they have received services at another
location in the past.2 0 5 While an individual could of course lie or
199.

See id. at 45902.
Where there is limited data sharing, providers should allow access to at least the
clients' names, SSNs, and birthdates in order to prevent the creation of duplicate
client records within the CoC. HUD encourages data sharing among providers
within a Continuum of Care as sharing of HMIS information allows maximum
benefits from such systems.

Id.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id at 45909-10.
See id.
Id. at 45906.
See id.
Id. at 45909.
Id. at 45905. HUD does not require service providers to ask specific questions, so a
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unknowingly give a false answer, the same could be said for all of the
information collected regarding an individual. If HUD did not operate
under the assumption that individuals receiving services told the truth,
then all of the data stored within an HMIS would be useless.
Rather, it would seem that HUD's collection of social security
numbers really comes down to a matter of convenience. "Where data are
shared across programs, SSN greatly improves the process of identifying
clients who have been previously served and allows programs to deduplicate upon program entry." 206 While using an individual's social
security number might make it easier to de-duplicate information at the
intake stage, it isn't necessary to do so at the intake stage because the
primary job of each CoC is to aggregate the local HMIS data and remove
duplicate information. 207 As explained above, CoCs can do this without
using an individual's social security number. While it might be more
convenient to collect this information, convenience should not be the
basis for a policy that involves collecting millions of people's personally
identifying information.
Collecting information about individual's previous residences is also
unnecessary to achieve Congress' goals for implementing HMIS. As
HUD repeatedly claims in its 2004 Final Notice, HMIS was not
implemented for the purpose of creating a national database tracking
homeless individual's movements. 208 Instead, HUD's rationale for
collecting geographic information is to learn more about which regions
experience homelessness and to what degree these regions experience
it. 209 But collecting the program identification number satisfies this
without collecting information regarding the location of individuals'
previous homes. If Congress/HUD is trying to ascertain the location of
where homelessness is occurring, it only makes sense to record the
location of where individuals are experiencing homelessness.
service provider would be acting within the scope of the 2004 Final Notice if the service provider
asked an individual if they had received services elsewhere. See id.
There are no mandated questions for obtaining the required information,

although recommended questions are provided in Exhibit 2 at the end of this
section. Providers have the flexibility to tailor data collection questions and
procedures to their circumstances as long as the information is accurately and
consistently collected given the response categories and definitions provided.
Id. An affirmative answer would clue the service provider into the fact that this hypothetical
individual (who has used services in the same region) has the same first, middle, and last name,
and was born on the same day as another individual.
206. Id. at 45906.
207.

See DATA DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 4.

208. HMIS, supra note 17, at 45890. "An HMIS initiative will include no Federal effort to
track homeless people and their identifying information beyond the local level." Id.
209. Id. at 45888.
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Furthermore, most homeless individuals do not have the means to afford
long distance travel, and besides that, homeless individuals' previous
addresses would not reveal anything about homelessness because the
individuals were not homeless at the time they lived there. While HUD's
intention was not to create a database tracking homeless individuals'
movements, collecting information about their previous residences only
seems to further that goal.
X. CONCLUSION

At a time when placing personal information online is routine and
sometimes even necessary behavior in our society, pervasive public
records laws will eventually do more harm than good. At a certain point,
the detrimental effects of inadvertently disclosing private information
online will outweigh the benefit Floridians once received from having
access to vast amounts of information through the liberal definition of
what qualifies as a public record. Take, for example, the lack of an
exemption for records of the payment of utility bills. This information is
undoubtedly available to the public so that interested tenants can see how
much they can expect to pay for utility services at a given location before
they sign a lease. Once an individual makes a public records request for
the utility rates of a given address, they are furnished with the most recent
utilities bill. That utilities bill contains the name of the current tenant of
that residence. Combined with the use of social media sites like Facebook
and Twitter, the ill-intentioned public records requestor could use the
name they obtained from the utility bill to obtain more potentially useful
information for the purpose of committing an identity theft. Even the
name and address received from the utility bill alone is likely enough to
wreak havoc. Simply put, pervasive public records laws make it easier
for criminals to commit identity theft. While many identity thieves
commit their crime through various forms of hacking, there is no reason
why the government should make their job easier.
While society as a whole becomes more and more aware of the threat
of identity theft, homeless individuals will continue to become a more
vulnerable target as long as their personal information within an HMIS is
subject to disclosure under Florida's public records laws. An HMIS
becomes a public record as soon as a Florida public official views the
information within it. Once a public record, it is equally likely that none
of Florida's current exemptions to disclosure would apply. While IIUD's
privacy standards may in fact preempt Florida's public records laws
through the doctrine of implied conflict preemption, both HUD and the
Florida legislature should not wait until the courts decide the issue. Even
though the legal analysis might not be clear, the correct policy decision
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is. HUD must clearly articulate an intention to preempt state laws that
provide lesser protection to personal information than their standards do,
and if not, HUD should stop collecting the information in the first place.
Meanwhile, the Florida legislature must immediately exempt an HMIS
from public records disclosure, and start protecting the rights of the
citizens that need their state's protection the most.
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